Ethic APK Guard icon
Ethic APK Guard icon

Ethic APK Guard

 Like

A local-first Android preflight for a selected APK. It explains whether the APK appears able to update the installed app without erasing its data, before the user opens an installer.

Ethic APK Guard screenshot 1

Cost / License

Since

  • New

Updated

  • Updated Oct 2026

Platforms

  • Android
  • Android SDK
Alternatives
0likes
0alternatives
0articles
Save

Features

Properties

Features

Highlights All activities

Ethic APK Guard News & Activities

Recent activities

Ethic APK Guard information

AlternativeTo Category

Security & Privacy

GitHub repository

  •  1 Star
  •  0 Forks
  •  0 Open Issues
  •   Updated  
View on GitHub
Ethic APK Guard was added to AlternativeTo by c17s5qhu on and this page was last updated .

No comments or reviews, maybe you want to be first?

What is Ethic APK Guard?

A local-first Android preflight for a selected APK. It explains whether the APK appears able to update the installed app without erasing its data, before the user opens an installer.

It reads the selected file through Android's system picker and compares package name, version code, signing certificates, declared signing history, minimum Android version, native ABIs, classes.dex, and newly requested dangerous permissions. It also reports update-relevant security changes: a debuggable candidate, newly allowed cleartext HTTP traffic, newly allowed app backups, a lower target SDK, and newly exported components.

The user can explicitly share a text-only technical report. The confirmation explains that it contains the package identifier, versions, an abbreviated certificate fingerprint, and detected changes; it never attaches the APK or a device-wide app list.

After analysis, an explicit action can hand that one selected APK to Android's system installer. Ethic APK Guard does not install or uninstall anything itself, never bypasses Android's final confirmation, and blocks its update action when the signing certificates are incompatible. A package with no installed match may be handed to Android only as a clearly labelled new application. Android may require the user to allow this app as an installation source first. It identifies common APKS and XAPK containers and explains their limit; installing split-package bundles is outside this deliberately single-APK flow.

After the local analysis, the user can separately and explicitly ask for public F-Droid context. Only then the app uses HTTPS to request the selected package identifier and version code from F-Droid's public package API, public metadata repository, and public reproducible-verification records. It never uploads the APK, its contents, its hash, or an inventory of installed apps. The remote servers may log the request. The report labels this material as public registry data: absence of an Anti-Feature or a verification record is not a safety certification, and presence in F-Droid is not a claim that the selected file is authentic.

The verdict is deliberately conservative: Android remains the final authority for installation, especially for split APKs and signing-certificate rotation.

QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES is declared because Android otherwise hides a dynamically selected package from the comparison API. In addition, <queries> declares known companion apps in the ecosystem to detect if they are installed and offer an "Open" action in the About menu. The app does not display, persist, or transmit a device-wide app list.

Analysis works without a network connection.

Release signing is local and opt-in. Provide KEYSTORE_PATH, KEY_ALIAS, STORE_PASSWORD, and KEY_PASSWORD to Gradle; no private key or password is committed. The public source repository is the reproducible handoff, while a distributed APK must be accompanied by its checksum and signing-certificate information.